Thoughts on Leibniz

1. The principle of sufficient reason and the principle of causality

There seems to be a strong connection between

1) The principle of sufficient reason
2) The principle of causality

Question: (nihil est sine ratione) = (nihil fit sine causa)

On the contrary to this question, we will point out why the principle of causality is only a special case of the principle of reason [1]

Why the principle of Causality cannot be grounded by itself

This should be easily understood: If the principle of causality can be understood in the form that A is only possible if B, then we should easily see that B cannot be sufficient, since B is still dependent. This means giving an account to the whole conditions for the possibility of A would also include the conditions for the possibility of B. The same is true for C and for D in the serious of things. Therefore the existence of the whole series of things would be the condition for the possibility of A. In other words, we have to assume that A is only possible because of X, while X includes the cause for the whole series of causes, this, however, cannot be a cause in the series of things, but has to be a cause in itself. Again X cannot be simply C, namely a contingent fact of the serious of things, since C would neither be sufficient to explain B, nor A, because it would be caused by something else. So causes are only possible on a ground that is their sufficient reason which cannot be a cause initself.

This implies a connection between contingent truths that are here in time and space and identities that are out there (See further notes for explanation). This first analysis of causes and reason relates to Leibniz understanding of sentences that can be uttered about the facts that we see ourselves confronted with and sentences that are in relation to identities. 

Moreover, we will argue in the following that these sentences do not represent something, but that they only present the role they play within a "space of reasons".

Leibniz assumes two sentence structures to be true:

2. Differentiation between contingent truths and identical truths

So there are:

1. general sentences like A est A (animal est animal) (this is tautological)
2. virtual, identical sentences like A est B (animal est rationale) (see Mittelstraß)

The idea is that virtuell sentences have to be transformed into the form AB est B in order to make sense. Otherwise we cannot claim that they express any knowledge, then they are rather only opinions.

Again in 1) we say that S is P, so that S contains P, in 2), on the other hand, the individual expression (Eigenname) has to be replaced by a complete concept (vollständiger Begriff). In Leibniz words, the inesse predication has to be presented (See Leibniz Discourse on metaphysics 42).

So, for example, Leibniz writes: "Now it is evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of things and that, when a proposition is not an identity, that is, when the predicate is not explicitly contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually. . . The subject term must always contain the predicate term, so that one who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know that the predicate belongs to it. (41)

I argue here that Leibniz gives us his first account to his epistemology, namely he define how we can know something. Because we know that knowing the predication of contingent facts is only possible for the understanding of God, the question becomes important how contingent sentences (this is what Leibniz calls an accident, namely sentences where the predicate is not immediately content in the subject . Discourse 41) can be understood. This must be with regard to necessary sentences.

In Brandom's idea of inferentialism this means that sentences have to be understood in their position they play in the space of reasons. This means that aposteriori sentences are still understood on the ground of a priori knowledge with respect to the whole.

I take the latter to be the case in terms of an assumption of the infinite, so that our knowledge is not a completed principle, but rather a produced one. This implies an opening toward the infinite, without grasping it, but only by assuming it.

Also Mittelstraß emphasizes the problem that the complete individual can never be given, so the question is how to deal with a world that cannot be represented, but that has to be known somehow? However, since the individual of the world can never be given completely there is no way to bring all contingent truths back to one immediate identaty. Mittelstraß expresses this with the  "die prinzipielle Unabgeschlossenheit einer gesicherten Orientierung in der Welt." (23)

However, Mittelstraß gives also, an example of how such a theory can give pragmatic orientation. The sentence s € P must be proven by more general sentences that imply s € P. So the sentence Alexander is reaonable can be expressed by showing that human beings are reasonable and that Alexander is a human being. Mittelstraß writes:

"Aufgrund dieser allgemeinen Bestimmung wäre etwa der Elementarsatz "Alexander ist vernünftig a priori wahr, wenn nur festgestellt wäre, daß Alexander unter die Beispiele für den Prädikator "Mensch" fällt."

This means that contingent sentences refer to necessities that ground them so that the sentence "Alexander is reasonable" can refer to the sentence "Alexander (is a (a human being is a reasonable life form) is reasonable." This implies that all contingent sentences have to be included into a larger structure that is presupposed when we only participate in the smaller structural moments.

In my interpretation this does not ground a completed holism, but a partial holism. This means that larger structures have  to be assumed in order to make contingent sentences meaningful. I take this to be reason. If we extend our desire for not knowing the "immediate given" that has a relation to larger structures, but if we want to know how these structures of reason are grounded, we have dedicated us to the project of a critique of Reason.

This project of reason is carried out by Brandoms Inferentialismus bzw. Holismus. He also takes it to be the case that individual expressions direct us into a desire for completeness (Verweisungsganzheit).

I take all of these current holistic projects as fragments, however, all of them unifies a denial of Representationalismus.

Further Notes

Leibniz Holism
Further indications of Leibniz toward a holism are given when he discusses the understanding of a substance that is. Leibniz writes: Moreover, every substance is like a complete world and like a mirror of God or of the whole universe, which each on expresses in its own way.  . . Thus the universe is in some way multiplied as man times as there are substances . . . For it expresses, however confusedly, everything that happens in the universe, whether past, present, or future - this has some resemblance to an infinite perception or knowledge. (42)

Now even though Leibniz first analyses might be correct, the theory of monads might overstretch the possibilities that can be assumed on safe grounds. I assume that these invalid exaggerations happen when we take our desires for knowledge that help us structuring contingent facts and that are necessary for the structuring of the contingent facts as realities.

Discussion of Kant
It seems to be an easy task to show the superiority of a later theory and to discuss all issues in terms of a progress, and certainly I take Kant's critique of the possibilities of reason as an improvment of a theory of reason in general. However, at the same time I do not see simply see that we can criticize Leibniz via Kant, I also see viable criticisms through Leibniz by his theory of perception.

Simply taking perceptions as many in one.


The discussion with Clarke, and Leibniz main argument (18)
Assumption: The sufficient reason of the being-so of the being-that is only the will of god that it is this way. In other words their is no foundation but the essence of God

Leibniz counterargument: God would want something that is unreasonable, namely that something is without sufficient reason.

Leibniz: "ein einfacher Wille ohne irgendein Motiv (ein bloßer Wille)" eine Fiktion sei", auch Haundlungen sich also auf ihre Gründe, sprich Motive, hin befragen lassen müssen. (18)

All rationality is the structure of S to its predicate 

In other words Leibniz relates all  reasons back to the more foundamental truths of sentences. So we can conclude that even Kant's unity of apperception must be the identity of language at all. Identities have to be seen in their roles that the play in a semantic theory or in theory of expressions. In this sense Brandom were right if he sees Leibniz as opening the gates to inferentialism.

"§31 und §32 der "Monadologie", daß "unsere Vernunfterkenntnisse" auf "zwei großen Prinzipien" beruhen. Erstens "auf dem des Widerspruchs, kraft dessen wir das als falsch beurteilen, was einen Widerspruch einschließt, und das wahr das, was zum Falschen entgegengesetzt oder kontradiktorisch ist". Zweitens "auf dem des zureichenden Grundes, kraft dessen wir annehmen, daß sich keine Tatsachen als wahr oder existierend, keine Aussage als wahr herausstellen kann, ohne daß es einen zureichenden Grund gäbe, weshalb es so und nicht anders ist, wenngleich uns diese Gründe sehr häufig durchaus nicht bekannt sein mögen." Ähnlich lautet die Bemerkung über den Satz vom Grund in § 7 der "Prinzipien". Sie besagt dort, daß "nichts ohne zureichenden Grund geschieht, d. h. sich nichts ereignet, ohne daß es dem, der die Dinge hinlänglich kennt, möglich wäre, einen Grund anzugeben, der zureicht, um zu bestimmen, warum es so ist und nicht anders".[1]

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[1] Leibniz und Kant: Erkenntnistheoretische Studien

 von Jürgen Mittelstraß Walter de Gruyter, 27.07.2011 - 346 Seiten 17  - 22

Questions to Dr. Selcer: Is the Monadologie superficial, so that I cannot quote from it?

Distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity

"In order to account for this problem, Leibniz proposes perspective as a means of individuating substances. For, while the notion of a subject contains all of its predicates and, as such, “is like a mirror of God or of the whole universe,” the only entity capable of the infinite analysis required to explicate the notion of a subject is God (AG, 42)." (Thomas)

Difficulties with Leibniz In esse predication: 

“the notion of an individual substance includes once and for all everything that can ever happen to it,” then there is no possibility for contingency, so that free will would not be possible. 

The criterion for knowledge, the in esse predication:

“future contingents are certain,” “that they are necessary on that account” (AG, 45). 

"For, he claims, the contraries of the predicates contained in the notion of a subject do not entail a contradiction and, as such, are not logically necessary. So, while all actions of a subject inhere virtually and may be known by an intellect capable of fully explicating the notion, those actions are not necessarily determined. The subject may always do differently, though she never will." (Thomas Ball)

What is a perception
What is an expression
What is a concept (Notion)

I take Leibniz to be an idealist with the phantom pain of realism

Idea Realism is only an phantom pain.

Parallel
Relation to Heidegger, the opening up of the ontological difference between the possibilities of an individual and its freedom with regard to the possibilies and the absolute necessity of being.

Has to be analyzed with regard to the sentence of ground