, the idea that we know objects by virtue of inferences, and the assumption that speakers can always hold different opinions based on the possibly different inferences that constitute an object for them.
The different backgrounds of people, however, lead to the communication problem which means that it is unclear of how we communicate about given objects.
The problem can also be explained in another way: What does it mean to have determinate objects?
, that the meaning of all words is interconnected. This means that there are no points that we refer to, but we point out structural relations.
according to which words are bound to small groups of meaning. "Kill", for example, is bound to "die" and "cause". This means that each word is composed by smaller atomistic parts.
these interconnected words have the same structure as reality. Conceptual Realism is a strategy that Brandom upholds.
In these two statements Quine expresses that there is no direct reference of an individual statement, but that it is instead the whole of science that is captured in each statement, because each statement is made on the grounds of a possible whole. Hempel comes up with a similar idea.
Meaning holism means therefore that each individual statement refers to language as a whole. Meaning Holism has some costs and they actually lead to the communication problem (according to http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-holism/)
A more specific way to define the problem that Brandom encounters with his communication problem is the problem of idiolects.
: "idiolect is a language (or some part or aspect of a language) that can be characterized exhaustively in terms of intrinsic properties of some single person, the person whose idiolect it is. The main force of ‘intrinsic’ is to exclude essential reference to features of the person's wider linguistic community, and perhaps too of their physical environment"
Note: The concept of intrinsic expresses an internalist standpoint that something can be entirely independent of external causes and still is such a thing.
Just because Brandom believes that we can operate without references does not mean that we have a problem of idiolects. In fact, humans who say we share a common capacity, namely to exchange reasons. And an approach of how that is supposed to work is Brandom's
Brandom's approach to explaining how determinate content is possible is lead by three basic concepts: inferences, substitution and anaphora.
So Brandom's main idea is that the content of inferences is preserved if it does not change a correct inference into a false inference
Example?
Two claims are incompatible if they are not substitutable.
Thus inferences have subsentential meaning that means that substitutes belong to them in a certain relation.
Making It Explicit (MIE) is Brandom's central book that is supposed to replace a representational semantics with a inferentialist semantics.
2.4 Brandom's navigation-model
According to Mueller, Brandom defends the
navigation-model. This means that we do not share contents but give information of how to navigate around contents.
There are some premises for understanding this:
a) First of all, we communicate, because we have different perceptions and conceptions of objects which make it necessary to share inferences that we could draw on objects so far:
"Brandom considers the systematic difference in information among individuals as the „point“ of communication""
This point of communication leads to a model of “navigating among perspectives without sharing contents” (see Mueller 2014). This must mean that we do not have correct contents in our mind, just because somebody utters a word. The relationship between mental images and communication must be more complex.
The main point of discussion, however, is:
How can we secure such communication without having any points of stable reference?
Brandom uses here the concept of anaphora which means that we always refer to something that preceded our utterances.
Main Question is then:
"Do "anaphoric connections between tokens uttered in discourse that can be used by every individual speaker in their own perspectival semantic substitution-economies" function?"
This question translates into: Can we communicate with each other, if we have no references that means objective things we can refer to?
3. Anaphora as a solution to the communications problem in inferentialism
Again
Brandom’s semantics is "purely inferential, hence non-referential nature of anaphora, coupled with the claim that anaphoric-inferential semantic mechanisms yield sufficient conditions for mutually successful “information-extraction” or interpretation".
Let us explain again the single words of this statement
Information-extraction means that we can extract information from sentences that are transmitted to us.
Anaphora are components a sentence that refer to another content, an antecedent, that precedes this content.
An
anaphoric-inferential semantic mechanism means that the meaning of a word (semantic) is decoded by a backward inference (a conclusion back to the premises of a word). This backward inference is of a specific type that resembles anaphoras.
Critique of Mueller: Brandom's inferentialist approach might not be successful to solve the communication problem, because Brandom relies on "covert “reference-infiltrations” that cannot be eliminated.
So Brandom does not work without reference? That is what Mueller claims:
"Regarding the latter, a new argument based on context-sensitive semantic phenomena in anaphoric settings shows that the crucial distinction between initiator or anaphoric antecedent and anaphoric dependent cannot be drawn according to Brandom’s own premises without overt and irreducible referential premises."
The question is more fundamental whether reference is necessary for having determinate concepts. Brandom's substitutional semantics will be explained further: Here.
4. The communication problem (in more specifics)
Müller defines the communication problem:
"Wird Signifikanz oder Gehalt von verwendeten Ausdrücken, Gedanken und Handlungen inferentialistisch als Rolle in einem gegebenen Folgerungssystem charakterisiert, aber zugleich bedeutungsholistisch keine noch so wahrnehmungsrelative Festlegung oder Folgerung eines kognitiven Systems von den potentiell gehaltsbestimmenden Bedingungen ausgeschlossen, dann stellt sich unter der unproblematischen Annahme, dass die genauen Hintergrundbedingungen zur Gehaltsbestimmung individuell variieren werden, die unmittelbare Frage, wie Kommunikation unter dieserart perspektivisch gehaltsbestimmenden Individuen möglich ist."
Müller gives a grammatically complicated analysis of the problem. For the most part it means: Inferentialism, and the assumption that speakers can always hold different opinions lead to the communication problem. This means we have no idea what we are talking about. We might say that this is not such a big problem, but it becomes clearer when Mueller writes:
(4) "Welchen Gehalt ein bestimmter Ausdruck (im Gegensatz zu anderen
gehaltvollen Ausdrücken ähnlicher grammatischer Art) hat, ergibt sich
wiederum vollständig aus der Rolle, die der Ausdruck für das
Gesamtsystem guter Schlussfolgerungen spielt, dem er angehört." (page 5)
So the content of an expression is defined by the role it has in a complete system of conclusions to which it belongs. Since, however, an expression can be interpreted in dependence of the language user, there is no determinate content.
So let us assume that we can grasp all possible interpretations of an expression x in a language t. Now let us assume that we also have all possible interpretations of an expression y in a language t. If interpretation, however, is not limited then the possible interpretations of x and y are exactly the same, namely the complete range of language t. If, however expression x, and expression y express everything in language t, then they do not express anything.
For example, let us say I see an object and call it a helicopter, while another person sees it and says it is car. Now both of our statements are interpretations and depending on the contextual conditions. We both might have reasons to call it this or that. Now, if any interpretation was possible, so that somebody else could call it a mule, or another on a planet, then we are in deep problems of contributing meaning to something at all. So what actually restricts us from having the most absurd interpretations of our surroundings and what makes us to specify?
We can also find an example that is more understandable. If I say "I see a bird", then 'bird' might mean very different things to people. It might mean an object that can fly, or it might mean a bird that cannot fly (like pinguins). In one instance I could express something that is capable of flying, in another instance I might not refer to this feature. The main problem is that referring to something does not mean to refer to its essence, but referring to its reconstruction. That, however, means that referring is preceded by certain types of inferences and this means we are not talking about things in the first place, but about agreed ideas of how to reconstruct something.
Also Abelard makes the argument that our statements cannot be about things because a statement can be about something that includes contradictory features, while things (according to the principle of non-contradiction that will be discussed elsewhere) cannot have contradictory features. For example, saying "There is a man in the house" might express that there is a man who is either black or white, but he cannot be both. We are, however, not surprised if we discover that the man is black and not white, though he could have been white. For this reason, Abelard concludes that a statement is not about things, but about states. Things cannot bear contradictory properties, but it is possible for stated objects as long as their features are not expressed, or if the features do not analytically follow from their meaning (I mean if they are not properties).
I do believe that Brandom attempts to tackle this problem with a similar approach in his inferentialism. Expressing something is at the same time expressing something about our conceptual net of reasons that we have gathered during our life, and an expression is never independent of this conceptual net. Now, Brandom tries to describe three basic rules of how we refer.
Brandom's idea is that our meanings are guided by substitutional rules. I do not make references but point out rules of substitution.
It is about exchanging structures (very good source: https://books.google.de/books?id=WMCoBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144&dq=brandom+substitution&source=bl&ots=FXT4ViJS7U&sig=isEdvPUbIGHWJ1fVilK4TnH60ow&hl=de&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjdl8z2npTPAhWEGT4KHXDqDxEQ6AEITjAI#v=onepage&q=brandom%20substitution&f=false)
Brandom's solution is to work without the representationalist repertoire, and to operate with so called norms of coherence and to achieve communication by virtue of that. ("inferenziell durch Kohärenznormen vollauf bestimmten und gehaltsbestimmenden Überzeugungssystemen hinweg"). His approach is "sozial-inferentialistisch". Brandom states:
" „inferential articulation broadly construed is sufficient to account for conceptual content“ (AR: 28)„inferentialist semantics is resolutely holist. On an inferentialist account of conceptual content, one cannot have any concepts unless one has many concepts. For the content of each concept is articulated by its inferential connections to other concepts. (…) Conceptual holism is (…) a straightforward consequence of this approach” (AR: 15-6)"
Conceptual holism is the idea that the content of an utterance is not its reference, but the whole of the life-form that uses this language as a possible whole. But how then does Brandom understand the content of an expression?
Brandom relates meaning (content) strongly to the reasons of why we exchange at all. For Brandom it is first of all a claim that is made, and by which somebody makes a content available to others. Claims then are for giving reasons, and not for representing in the first place:
„For information (whether true or false) to be communicated is for the claims undertaken by one interlocutor to become available to others (who attribute them) as premises for inferences. Communication is the social production and consumption of reasons” (MIE: 474). (page5)
We will look at the solution in more detail in the next point. First of all, however, we discuss
Brandom's deflationism. He states:
„truth and reference are philosopher’s fictions, generated by grammatical misunderstandings” (MIE: 324)
Brandom's deflationism, however, does not extend beyond the criticism of a direct empirical, referentialist approach.
5. Intentionality
Intentionality should also be understood within the boundaries of an inferentialist semantics. It is not simply located in the internal goal of the action.
»Daß etwas von jemandem als intentionales System betrachtet oder behandelt wird, rangiert in der Reihenfolge der Erklärung vor der Tatsache, daß es ein intentionales System ist« (Brandom 2000, 109).
Intentionality is depending on the linguistic community that institutionalizes certain behaviours that are evaluated as intentions afterwards. see http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~vogd/Brandom.pdf 1 Werner Vogd, 2004, vogd@zedat.fu-berlin.de
Intentional states are determined by the social practice of giving and asking for reasons.
»Ewas als verstandesfähig zu behandeln heißt, sein Verhalten dadurch zu erklären, dass man ihm intentionale Zustände wie Überzeugungen und Wünsche für sein Verhalten unterstellt« (ders., 38).
For these issues we developed a normative vocabulary and express it in the deontic score keeping.
"Erst die gemeinsame sprachliche Praxis »überzieht eine natürliche Welt mit normativen Signifikanzen, die intrinsisch keine Richtlinien oder Urteilsmaßstäbe enthält«. Objektivismus und Subjektivismus, »bedeutungslose Gegenstände und Bedeutung schaffende Subjekte« erscheinen so als »zwei Aspekte eines Bildes« (ders., 96), nämlich der pragmatisch normativen Konstitution von Wirklichkeit mittels der wechselseitigen Zuweisung entsprechender Status." (Seite 2)
So what is truth?
"Wenn im Diskurs beispielsweise der Äußerung a von Sprecher A, durch B Wahrhaftigkeit zuerkannt wurde, so sieht sich hierdurch auch B berechtigt, im weiteren Gespräch a als wahr zu nehmen. Die Begriffe „wahr“ und „falsch“ brauchen hier nicht mehr im traditionellen Sinne als Eigenschaften, die den Dingen innewohnen, verstanden werden. Vielmehr wird eine »Behauptung als wahr zu betrachten« zuallererst »als das Übernehmen einer normativen Einstellung« verstanden (ders., 464).
The main idea is that language is not something that simply is established, but that it can be derived from the idea of cooperation:
"Die Annahme einer priviligierten Wir-Perspektive der Gemeinschaft gibt hier keinen erklärenden Sinn mehr, denn den hieraus abgeleiteten normativen Regelkonzepten fehlt die für die Zuweisungeines normativen Status benötigte Referenz auf einen konkreten Beobachter."
It is time now to look more into Brandom's solution
6. The solution: Subsitution, and anaphora
To "pick up a speaker’s tokening [to, AM] (...) connect it to their own substitution-inferential commitments. is part of what makes it possible (…) (to extract) information from it” (MIE: 475) " (according to Mueller)
Deixis präsupponiert Anapher. (see Müller 20)
For example:
Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
I 438
Anapher/Brandom: man beschreibt eine Katze nicht, wenn man sich auf sie mit "sie" bezieht."man beschreibt eine Katze nicht, wenn man sich auf sie mit "sie" bezieht."
I 627
Anapher/Referenz/Einmaligkeit/Unwiederholbarkeit/Brandom: Substitution ist für unwiederholbare Tokenings natürlich nicht definierbar - daher muss sich anaphorisch auf sie bezogen werden
Final ideas of anaphers
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237611969_A_UNIFIED_ACCOUNT_OF_ANAPHORA_FOR_BRANDOM_%27S_INFERENTIALISM
Brandom on Expressive Deflationism http://www.academia.edu/12318848/Explanatory_vs._Expressive_Deflationism_About_Truth
X. Final remark: a possible middle
An anderen Stellen deutet Brandom eine in Diskussionen mit McDowell entwickelte konziliatorische Selbstdarstellung an, in der er die Plausibilität eines Mittelwegs zugesteht, der inferentialistisch und referenzialistisch identifizierbare Normen als irreduzibel aufeinander zugrundelegt und aufeinander als gegenseitige Beschränkungen bezieht. Als Hilfestellung zur korrekten Einordnung seiner Erklärung des „commitment to invert the representationalist order of explanation” (MIE: 135) gesteht Brandom bereits in MIE in einer Fußnote zu , dass er zwar den Gegensatz repräsentationalistischer und inferentialistischer Herangehensweisen betone, aber „other possibilities include treating neither representation nor inference as explanatorily prior to the other. One might then go on to explain both in terms of some third notion, which is treated as more fundamental. Or one might eschew reductive explanations in semantics entirely“. 64 Auch in Antwort auf McDowells prinzipielle Einwände gegen den Versuch, begrifflichen Gehalt in Absehung von der Repräsentationsfunktion begrifflicher Ausdrucksmittel aufklären zu wollen (den McDowell als reduktionistisch versteht), macht Brandom wiederholt deutlich, dass It may be, after all, that neither can be understood apart from the other — that reference and inference come as an indissoluble conceptual package that cannot be analyzed reductively, but only relationally. I agree, of course . [Herv.AM] Looking for a way to get an independent theoretical grip on one range of concepts, and then explicating the other in terms of it is only one strategy for illuminating the relations between the representational and inferential perspectives on semantic content. (…) The aim of MIE is not to say that the inferentialist order of explanation is the only one that can provide semantic illumination. It is to explore what kind of illumination it can provide (…) inference and representation are co-ordinate concepts”.
more definitions here: http://www.hausarbeiten.de/faecher/vorschau/114291.html
Normativity
"He maintains that the meaning of linguistic expressions should not
primarily be specified in terms of truth conditions but in terms of
their entailments."
This means the truth of a sentence depends on what it entails, not on what it represents.
"That
is, the propositional content of linguistic expressions is determined
by what they materially entail. Logical rules are explained as
generalizations of good material inferences which are presupposed as
primitives of the system (Brandom 1994: Ch. 6)[...]. Due to
the inferential character of assertions, if some one asserts something,
she is not only committed to t he assertion she just asserted, but also
to every assertion which is materially entailed by it. And vice versa,
the only way of licensing an assertion is a commitment to assertions
which entail the assertion in question. For this reason, Brandom
describes our linguistic practice as ‘the game of giving and asking for
reasons’ : I’m responsible for every statement I assert. Responsibility
is understood as an obligation to justify my assertion by giving reasons
for it . In giving reasons for an assertion, one makes explicit the
inferential relations which are already implicit in the propositional
content of the original assertion.http://philpapers.org/archive/REIBPI
