Brandom for introductory purposes

A Reader for further research, Comments on further sources are welcome

I. General Ressources

1. Brandom on Wikipedia (English, German)

German Wiki lists Brandom as one of the most influential philosophers of the present

2. Brandom's CV

Just to get a general idea of him.

3. Brandom's Prepuslished Work and Courses

Brandom publishes many unfinished papers, and course manuscripts on his webpage.

4. Brandom's Recommendations on Brandom

Brandom recommends books that are central to understand his work.




II. Further Detailed Explanations of the Brandomian Framework

1. Some Fundamental Problems and Explanation of Terms

Explanation of Brandom's normative pragmatics (a rulebound understanding):

a) The "most important activity of humans" is "undertak[ing] commitments.
b) These commitments are bound by rules according to which we understand our actions.

Wittgensteinian critique of a rulebound understanding: We run into an infinite regress of rules because we need meta-rules of how to apply rules and so forth.

Brandom's solution for the infinite regress of rules: Rules do not come from the internal source of the thinking self, but are established by preexisting human communities with preexisting understandings. We thus follow implicitly performatives that are established by societies (see Bacon, M. (2014) Pragmatism: An Introduction. John Wiley & Sons.)

Why is this important?

A Normative Pragmatics avoids problems of externally approached meaning. It does not presuppose a naked reality but approaches persons as first instances of meaning. I claim that our theoretical discourses should be lead by the question of how we are, and not of what we are with regard to a physicalist, or realist mindset.

Inferentialism: The idea that there is never only one concept, but that concepts are only true with regard to other concepts. The condition for the truth of a concept is thus not its reference to a given object, but its embeddment into inferences

Brandom's Antirepresentationalism: It is his inferentialism, namely the rejection that our utterances represent most and for all objects in an external real world. Representation is rather a minor function in a game of giving and asking for reasons.

Brandom's two sides of the coin, Pragmatism and Semantics

Raffaela Giovagnoli writes:

"Brandom’s theory presents two different but related sides: a pragmatic side, in which he investigates the significance of the speech-act, referring to the normative roles that govern the keeping of deontic score; a semantic side that clarifies the contents of discursive commitments, referring to the inferential substitutional rules."

These two sides are concerning the intended pragmatic integration of semantics, or as Brandom claims "semantics has to answer pragmatics". Brandom states the following:

“The essential point is that philosophical semantic theory incorporates an obligation to make the semantic notions it appeals to intelligible in terms of their pragmatic significance”[Brandom (1994a). p. 145, according to Giovagnoli].

 So the main point is here that semantic notions have no meaning if they are not embedded in the contexts of a community that communicates these semantic concepts. For example, there is no reason to discuss an object, like mushrooms, if there is not a pragmatic difference in perceiving such objects. What counts as a mushroom for one person, might be interpreted much different by another person. So, to progress with the example, a poisonous mushroom is relevant to be identified. In this sense Giovagnolie proceeds:

The goal of a philosophical semantic theory is, therefore, to show how the content is associated with expressions or states (Raffaela Giovagnoli)

Semantic content must depend on rules of expression that make utterances viable for a communication culture. There is no need to communicate about the fact that I have a representation of a mushroom in my head. There is a pragmatic significance, however, that I perceive a certain mushroom to be a poisonous mushroom, and that should be communicated to affected members of my community. If, moreover, there was not this problem of communication, then communication would be unnecessary.


Brandom's Deflationism (Denying a Theory of Truth): The Inferential Embeddment of Propositions

a) The Midas' Touch:

"Brandom does not understand content here in terms of referential, intentional properties which have a phenomenal "aboutness" as their essential nature. Brandom understands propositional content "in terms of inference rather than truth" (Mosteller 2014: 80)

Brandom denies that the content of our utterances is primarily directed towards things that we are refering to (referential). Things are also not derived from our intentional approach towards them as outer beings (intentional properties). Our utterances are not about something but are related to our activity of inferences. Our utterances are expressing our normative attitude towards contents. For this reason, Brandom writes:

"two claims that have the same conceptual content iff [if and only if] they have the same inferential role" (p.167)" (according to Mosteller 2014: 80)

Brandom's inferentialism kicks in here, and is explained in the following:

"To be propositionally contentful is to be able to play the role both of premise and of conclusion in an inference" (pp. 167-168)." (according to Mosteller 2014: 80)

So conceptual content is accepted, iff its possible term can be substituted in other inferences without changing their truth-outcome. So what does it mean to understand a sentence and its declared proposition?

"we have "practical mastery of its inferential role. This is according to Brandom, a "kind of know how rather than knowing that." (Mosteller 2014: 81)

So knowledge is about our mastery of treating something inferentially, instead of only referring to things. This means, we can distinguish between good and bad inferences. A photocell, as well as a parrot, they both do not understand the concept of red. If they 'answer' it will only be a stimulus response: "This is red". Humans, on the other hand, can master this concept by understanding its inferential role. (See Mosteller 2014: 81) Understanding its inferential role means to accept that 'red'

see Mosteller, T. (2014) Theories of Truth: An Introduction. Bloomsbury Publishing



"For the same reasons that baseball can be played on the sandlots and soccer can be played in the streets, ethical discourse can retain an objective dimension without there being a single authority on questions of truth and falsity. In ethics, as in most other forms of objective discourse, we are all keeping track of our interlocutors' attitudes, as well as our own. (Stout, 2004:272, according to Bacon, M Introduction to Pragmatism) https://books.google.com/books?id=ZSz4AgAAQBAJ&pg=PT160&dq=brandom+representing+represented&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwifxOHhh_HOAhXBGh4KHaecCNoQ6AEILjAD#v=onepage&q=brandom%20representing%20represented&f=false

Frege's Begriffsschrift

"Frege's Begriffsshrift: here Frege suggests that two sentences have the same conceptual content if they may be substituted one another preserving the goodness of the inferences in which they appear, or preserving the consequences we may trace from them (the original example of Frege is a pair of sentences in active and passive form)." http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/hp/penco/pub/bpuz.htm#0

Commitments and Entitlement

"Entitlements are to be interpreted as the circumstances of applications or premises which entitle you to make a claim; commitments are the consequences you are bound to accept, given the claim you have" made. http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/hp/penco/pub/bpuz.htm#0

"Therefore a perceptual report, like "it is red", is a proper meaningful utterance only in a game where the speaker is committed to the consequences of the utterance, for instance: "it is not blue" or "it has a color". A parrot who has been trained to utter the same sounds when facing a red thing does not give to the sounds any conceptual content." http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/hp/penco/pub/bpuz.htm#0

"It is easy to define an inferential role for predicates (let us think, for instance, to a semantic network given via meaning postualtes); but it is really hard to define an infernetial role for indexicals and proper names. One of the most original aspect of Brandom's analysis is to enclose also these kinds of subsemntential expressions in an inferentialist framework, via the concept of anaphora." http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/hp/penco/pub/bpuz.htm#0

Remaining problem: "A problem remains: which kind of inferential role may be given to subsentential parts? It is easy to define an inferential role for predicates (let us think, for instance, to a semantic network given via meaning postualtes); but it is really hard to define an infernetial role for indexicals and proper names. One of the most original aspect of Brandom's analysis is to enclose also these kinds of subsemntential expressions in an inferentialist framework, via the concept of anaphora." 

Continuation in the article on Anaphora