Samstag, 30. November 2013

Hobbes and principles (Questions that I have to answer, for practicing philosophy)

Hobbes makes clear that all philosophy has to connect to first principles or shared definitions. Now the question becomes very urgent: Where do the principles come from?

According to Hobbes: Principles do not come from anything. We can only agree on the ground of our contingent nature. Agreement is the nature of human discourse. 

However, do we follow ideas of agreement? What does make a good agreement? What is the foundation for an agreement? 

I would like to argue that we in our contingent nature have to follow something more then contingent facts in order to give reason. So, for example, we rather follow some principle, instead of claiming nothing to be our principle.

Of course, a principle seems also to be the right of the strongest as a kind of intuitive, bodily lived impulse, but society is a game changer. If we want to agree in societies on something, we must at least agree on a rule that transcends the individuals desires for power. A rule relates to reason, since it has to be followed more than once. Even though we might not be able to demonstrate a constitutive rule for reason, there have to be rules and this is not something we agree upon, but that we simply live by necessity of agreement.

Do we live for ourselves?

The opposite of such a ruled living would be something that cannot be represented in mind, since it follows nothing that can be thought. 

I claim therefore: We desire for principles and what else could we call this deep desire? The desire for society is a desire for the opposite of the desire, a community where we leave our desires for a moment of shared worlds. Humans share worlds as they share ideas and as the share in the same world.

Nevertheless, where does the break come from that breaks our rules that desire for murder?

Rules are only broken by new rules. What is the time in between? I talk explicitely about the moment, when a rule is substituted by a new rule. Is it a continuity, so that both rules are connected, so that they are not distinct? Is there a superrule that connects all minor rules? Or are the rules rather unconnected? But if they are unconnected what is the space in between? A space without rules?

If there is a superrule, then all rules must be one rule. Is this right?

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