Why even god follows causes - Leibniz and his argument about God in the debate on sufficient reason.

The posttitle promises too much. I rather discuss technically some issues between Leibniz and Clark with respect to the idea of the principle of sufficient reason.

The discussion with Clarke, and Leibniz main argument

So Clarke's main assumption in the debate regarding sufficient reason can be expressed this way:

The sufficient reason for the being-so of the being-that is only the will of god, namely that it is this way. In other words, their is no foundation, but the essence of God. The essential being of the world is not reasonable, but merely an essence. 

I cannot think essentialism different from irrationalism.

Leibniz counterargument speaks therefore in the voice of reason which is the voice God: If the world is grounded on God's pure will, this would imply that God would want something that is unreasonable, namely that something is without sufficient reason.

If there were something without sufficient reason, then there would be no absolute necessity. This would leave us with the question when it is enough reason, since it might turn out that all of our endeavors are only contingent.

No reason
It is enough and we can call it day. As we usually asume there has to be an end of reasoning and the children have to be send to bed. Essentialism, the asylum of ignorants, escapes the marter of infinite analysis. It does not oblige itself to reason.

However, is there an essential will without motife, without having something in mind that it could be reason of? Well, I do not think that we can want to be a random individual that makes no sense. This would be someway destructive. We have to oblige ourselves to reason, otherwise there would be not very much to be justified.

Essentialism which is an irrationalism cannot be justified, since all justification would put on reasonable grounds. But what is it then?

In the words of Leibniz it sounds this way: "ein einfacher Wille ohne irgendein Motiv (ein bloßer Wille)" eine Fiktion sei", auch Handlungen sich also auf ihre Gründe, sprich Motive, hin befragen lassen müssen. (18)

(nach Leibniz und Kant: Erkenntnistheoretische Studien  von Jürgen Mittelstraß Walter de Gruyter, 27.07.2011 S. 18)