Hegel Perception: Or the thing and deception - Perception as a result of Sense-Certainty and the necessary moments of Perception

In the Chapter Perception: Or the thing and deception Hegel discusses how the negations of sense-certainty can become one object in the empirical world.

1. Introductory Considerations regarding the negating activity of sense-perception
The question is how do we unify all the different sense-perceptions that are given by our negating activity. This negating activity takes different spatio-temporal moments as negations of other moments. Hegel puts a lot of emphasize on the flux of our negating activity and clearly relates to the Spinozist doctrine that all determination is negation (Omnis determinatio est negatio). However, the question is whether the content can be only negation or whether there has to be assumed a last constituent that makes the negating relations possible. We have to keep this question in mind with regard to our reconstruction. I do not see it immediately answered. Nevertheless, I regard an answer to this question as the root for different Hegel-interpretations that might develope.

2. Perception in contrast to sense-certainty

While immediate certainty simply wants to grasp the "this", perception steps beyond and tries to grasp the being which is universal. My assumption is that Hegel means the being of an individual thing as it is also revealed later one. However, before we will run through different steps that are necessary for this, namely the definition of essence, anti-essence, properties, thinghood, and things.

First Hegel analyzes the moments of the perception that unifies the different negating moments of sense-certainty. The moments of perception are both universal, namely the universal I and the object as general. Both are necessarily related.

(Remark on Terminology: "Necessary" since Kant stands in opposition to "Contingent". "Contingent" might be related to Experience (Erfahrung), while necessary is a derived analytical truth that is given with the concept itself namely with perception)
(Remark on Brandom's realism: It is noteworthy that Brandom is going to develope an understanding of reality as conceptual, so that he actually diminishes the role of contingency dramatically. If I am correct he rejects the idea of contingency).

With regard to the necessary relation between the I and the general object Hegel points out:
"In the essence the object is the same as the movement: the movement is the unfolding and differentiation of the two moments, and the object is the apprehended togetherness of the moments." (Hegel, §111) 

If we take the I as the central carrier of the movement and the object as the unfolding of the movement both can be thought as the same.

(Note on Kant: Already Kant postulated such an identity between the noumenon and the I-think in his deduction, since the I-think as the unity of the categories has to apply the categories to something that shall be experienced. Hegel who develops a different path distinguishes himself from Kant by not positing to stems of cogntion that are ontologically different. This idea supports Brandom's idea of a conceptual realism)

The identity between the movement through the two moments, namely the moment of indicating (Aufzeigen) and the moment of perception (Wahrnehmen) as the object (Gegenstand) has to be discussed in more detail:

3. The moments of perception